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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND ) 
SECURITIES, INC., ) PETITION FOR A 
) WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Respondent, ) 
vs. ) CASE NO: 
HELEN KNUDSVIG, ) 
Petitioner. ) (CATEGORY NO. 14) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I. Whether a violation of Federal Securities Law 
can be raised as a mandatory counterclaim in a State Court 
action. 
POINT II. Whether a violation of Securities Dealers 
Rules gives rise to a federal question or a state court 
action. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) and Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals 
was entered on February 7, 1989, and a thirty (30) day 
extension was granted by this Court March 8, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA)SE 
That the Petitioner is a 61 year old lady who has 
habitually dabbled in penny stocks, usually in the amount of 
1 
a few hundred dollars or less, investing in new issues which 
would hopefully achieve a quick rise in value. (T. 399) 
The Respondent attempted to establish that the Petitioner 
was an experienced and sophisticated investor, but this is' 
contrary to the facts. (T. 555) In 1984 the Petitioner 
bought $200.00 worth of penny stocks in a company known as 
Venture Consolidated, which amounted at that time to 20,000 
shares. The particular stock was a new issue and a typical 
penny stock offering and the corporation Respondent was the 
market maker of the issue in any market which would follow. 
(T. 506, 517 and 549) The plan was to sell 100 million 
shares and insiders eventually captured 23% of the actual 
200,000 plus shares which were sold while the public holding 
was to remain at 200,000. (T. 506, 517, 518 and 549) 
The investment was to be held in cash with the plan to 
be that at a shareholders meeting a merger and consolidation 
with several other corporations would be made with the 
resulting entity to be known as Tires, Inc., authorizing a 
20 to 1 reverse stock split, taking place immediately 
thereafter. The particular shareholders meeting to occur on 
September 19, 1984. (T. 531, 532} In the meantime, Venture 
Consolidated stock rose from one cent (1<) to sixteen cents 
(160) or seventeen cents (170), the sole reason for the rise 
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being the proposed merger and the general market making 
activities of the Respondent brokerage* (T-. 531, 532, 577, 
600) The result of the activities of the Respondent and 
others with the consistent rise in value of Venture Consol-
idated and eventually Tires, Inc. stock. It resulted in the 
Petitionees original $200.00 investment being worth approx-
imately $30,000.00 and at the time of trial based again upon 
the general market making activities of the Respondent 
brokerage and/or other insiders activity. (T. 531, 571, 
592-600) 
That the Respondent had at all times maintained an 
Ogden office with an account executive in that office by the 
name of Lou Babcock who was well acquainted with the Respon-
dent. (T. 461-471, 557) That Mr. Babcock visited with the 
Petitioner on September 14, 1984, and advised her of the 
stock's recent climb in value and offered to sell it for 
her, (T. 467) and that such a sale would bring on the 
recording an additional indication of an increase of fixed 
value for the market making activity and would serve also to 
pick up the stock in the face of what appeared to be high 
promotional activity in order to prevent profit taking 
before the explosion in value which was about to occur. (T. 
531, 532, 571) While the motive to sell the stocks on 
3 
commission was no doubt present, any such commission would 
be very small. 
That the Petitioner was excited about the potential 
rise in value and decided to obtain a second opinion by 
placing a call to the Respondent's Salt Lake office and 
requesting further information. (T. 443) That the broker 
who received the call interpreted the conversation to be a 
request for sale of shares and that he contacted the vice 
president for instructions on how to handle a sale inasmuch 
as there was no stock certificate with the Respondent 
brokerage. (T. 454, 455) In spite of the perceived diffi-
culty, the vice president of the brokerage immediately 
approved the sale and the brokerage then made an entry that 
the purchase was made for their own market making account. 
(T. 451, 452) 
That the Respondent failed to give notice of the 
transaction as required by its own agreement with the 
Petitioner in addition to other requirements of SEC rules 
and NASD rules. (T. 404, 459, 471, 435, 505) 
That the Petitioner had no intention of making a sale 
of her shares and was aware of the fact that such a sale 
could not take place without the presence of a stock certif-
icate. She had in the past had such a sale cancelled as 
opposed to having a purchase made by the brokerage to cover 
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what is known as a "short sale". (T. 565) One of the 
reasons Petitioner never received a stock- certificate is 
that it would serve the personal interest of insiders market 
making activity to freeze outsiders and prevent their profit 
taking in interference with the stock's rise by making it 
more difficult to profit take. (T. 571) That regulations 
and the broker!s contract itself with the Petitioner 
required a winding up and closing of all transactions within 
five (5) days after a sale or purchase occurred, (T. 552, 
451, 455) That the Respondent made no effort to close in 
the required five (5) day period and that they in fact 
preferred not to do so, preferring instead to await further 
developments. (T. 456-458, 527-529) 
That the stock rose uniformly through the next period 
of time without any drop below the sales price so that the 
brokerage position would not in any way be threatened. (T. 
456-458, 527-529) That after approximately seventy-five 
(75) days when the Respondent decided to make a transfer 
purporting to cover the short, making an entry that they had 
bought from their own profit making account. (T. 5 23) 
That this resulted in a paper calculation that if the 
sale was made in accordance with the original sales entry, 
that a short coverage was effected at the repurchase date 
and that the Petitioner would owe the $5,400.00 claimed in 
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Respondent's Complaint because of the steady rise of the 
market during the intervening seventy-five (75) days and 
Respondent's daliance. That Respondent knew that it would 
not be closing within five (5) days, even assuming that the 
original sale had actually taken place, and let the matter 
ride at the Petitioner's risk and should now be estopped to 
make any claim against the Petitioner. (T. 451-459) 
That the Respondent brokerage made all such trans-
actions strictly to and from their own market making ac-
counts and records with no threat to their position. (T. 
451-459, 523, 524) That Petitioner's shares could not be 
sold without possession of the certificate. (T. 452-455) 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals made a sua sponte 
finding that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear or 
adjudicate any of the issues raised in Petitioner's Counter-
claim. The Court found that even though such Counterclaim 
was a mandatory Counterclaim, that it could not raise a 
matter of violation of Federal Securities Laws, which it 
found to be reserved exclusively to the Federal Courts. 
That at the same time, the Utah Court of Appeals also 
found that violation of the NASD Rules governing brokerages 
and dealers was also an exclusive Federal question since a 
provision of the Federal Securities Laws required the 
formulation of such rules. The Utah Court of Appeals 
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therefore denied any damages as awarded by the Trial Court 
and found that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to award 
the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW BY WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI THE DECISION OF THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS IF ONE OF THE CONSID-
ERATIONS OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT IS MET. 
This Court can review by Writ of Certiorari a decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals when there are special impor-
tant reasons therefore. Rule 43 lists four different 
categories of what the Court will consider in granting a 
Writ of Certiorari and the Petitioner believes that three of 
the four grounds stated in Rule 43 would apply in this case. 
(2) "When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial procedurings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of this court's power of 
supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of munici-
pal, state, or federal law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by this 
court. 
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In this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals denied that a 
State Court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate a question 
of Federal law even though such question might be found to 
be in the nature of a mandatory Counterclaim. The Petition-
er is unaware of any other rulings of this Court which have 
specifically addressed the question and believes it involves 
an important question to be resolved. 
That such question was raised sua sponte on the part of 
the Court of Appeals as it was not raised by either Respon-
dent or Petitioner during the course of that appeal. 
Petitioner believes that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is in conflict with this Court's decision in the 
case of Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 
109 (Utah 1984) , and cases which have interpreted the State 
of Utah's version of the Uniform Commercial Code as found in 
§§ 70A-8-315 and 70A-8-319 and 70A-8-401. 
That at a minimum, the Utah Court of Appeals should 
have remanded the matter to the Trial Court to find if any 
relief could have been granted based upon a State Court 
question, particularly in view of the Court's decision in 
Cowen and Co., v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co,, Supra. 
That the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question in the conflict of State and Federal law, which has 
not been but should be, settled by this Court as to whether 
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the Courts of this State have the jurisdiction to rule on 
questions of Federal Securities laws and whether violation 
of the rules of a particular exchange or brokerage are 
violated gives rise to a Federal or State Court cause of' 
action. 
The Petitioner would request that this Honorable Court 
grant a review by a Writ of Certiorari of the Utah Court of 
Appeals case under considerations (2) , (3) and (4) as set 
forth above. 
POINT II. 
THAT WHETHER A VIOLATION OF ASSOCIATION 
BROKERAGE RULES GIVES RISE TO A QUESTION 
OF STATE OR FEDERAL LAW WAS ERRONEOUSLY 
DECIDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Court of Appeals attempts to make an assumption as 
the basis for excluding the Counterclaim of the Petitioner 
that is not justified by the law. The Court of Appeals 
makes reference to "§ 15a(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 USCS § 78o-3 (b) - (6) , 1981, as requiring 
securities associations such as NASD to adopt disciplinary 
rules. Even if this were to be found to be a specific 
requirement, it does net give rise to a Federal question. 
The Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction 
and their jurisdiction is limited to those areas specifical-
ly prescribed by the Constitution and acts of congress. 
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Unless a specific and exclusive granting of jurisdic-
tion is to be found in the Constitution or acts of congress, 
there is no jurisdiction on the part of the Federal Courts. 
This Court has previously apparently decided a similar 
issue on appeal in the case of Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984), but not withstanding 
that, the Court of Appeals attempts to say that neither this 
Court or any other Court in the State of Utah may adjudicate 
or rule upon such issues. That such a finding on the part 
of the Court of Appeals is not justified, particularly in 
view of the previous rulings of this Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Court should grant a Writ of Certiorari based upon 
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court to allow this Court to exercise its power 
of supervision and to resolve important questions regarding 
conflicts between State and Federal law, and questions of 
State Court jurisdiction. 
DATED this /S day of April, 1989. 
A / '• •' .'/ - .'.•' 7 
A1IA,^H- V7- U"*y*-»'\ 
GERALD S. WIGHT' 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Recorded Bosk 1 $7] 
**• 1296'...", 
GERALD S. WIGHT, #3461 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO: 92290 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the 
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close 
of testimony and oral argument, and having previously 
rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as 
follows: 
1. That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed 
no cause of action. 
2. That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 2§J$Q 
shares of Venture Consolidated which has since^ 
JUDGMENT 1 29^> 
Recorded Book i t5 P-
Ke 12.97.... 
Indexed | 
converted by the company to 1,000 shares of Tires, Inc., and 
has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has 
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or 
against the Defendant. 
3. That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule 
10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and 
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the 
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its 
involvement and hold and control over the subject corpo-
ration with the knowledge and inside information of its 
dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all 
such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in at-
tempting to convert her stock, all in violation of all 
applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defen-
dant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in 
the amount of $35.00. 
4. It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or 
any other entity which has previously been served with or 
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining 
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release 
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant 
upon appropriate application. 
JUDGMENT 2 
Recorded BookJL O .i 
Pd^ e . U 9 S . .. 
Indexed 
/o DATED th is / j / day of (Tetter?, 1986. 
/ \ BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN F.//WAHLQUIST 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
-'' 0 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^ O day of October, 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage 
prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Craig F. McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, #528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JUDGMENT, 
CJ Q 7 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT Rule 44 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments , orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
^Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
fmitiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
|pcled, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43, Considerations governing review of cert iorari . 
^Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
ftherefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
_" same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
_ r„ court; 
iTr" (3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
Vfr has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
£v for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
f
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
^,by this court, 
dded, effective April 20, 1987.) 
[Jtule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
part ies. 
i[a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti->ner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing * and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a tition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be iced on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall rve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-ited. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in s case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case, 
srvice and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
Ob') Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join m a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
pfcmore of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
Sp. a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
End involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
Petition for PJ writ of certiorari covering all the cases 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Western Capital and Securities, 
Iri2., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Helen Knudsvig, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No, 880198-CA 
F I L E D 
F;EB JH989 
T. Noonan 
CSH^fof ** Court 
Utah Court of Appeate Second District, Weber County The Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
Attorneys: Craig F. McCullough, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Gerald S. Wight, Ogden, for Respondent 
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Jackson. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff and appellant, Western Capital and Securities, 
Inc. (Western), filed an action to recover $5,402.20 damages 
incurred when defendant and respondent, Helen Knudsvig, failed 
or refused to deliver a stock certificate after she allegedly 
requested Western to sell stock for her. Knudsvig counter-
claimed, alleging that Western had violated Rules 10b-5 and 
10b-10 promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, and various rules of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD). We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
Western is a broker-dealer registered with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah 
Securities Division. Knudsvig is a sixty-one-year-old customer 
who occasionally purchased penny stocks through Western and 
other brokerage firms. The trial court found that she was not 
a sophisticated investor and only traded a few hundred dollars 
worth of stock per year. 
The conditions in the brokers* contract between Western and 
Knudsvig required settlement of all transactions five days 
after a sale or purchase. The relevant provisions read: 
4. All transactions shall be settled by 
the fifth full business day following the 
sale or purchase . . . and at your option, 
if you shall not have received cash for 
the securities purchased for my account or 
delivery of the securities sold for my 
account, appropriately endorsed and in 
proper negotiable form, on the fifth full 
business day following the purchase or 
sale, as the case may be, you shall have 
the right, either with or without demand 
upon or notice to me, such demand or 
notice being expressly waived, to close my 
account, or any trade or transaction 
included herein on any such exchange or 
market, at public or private sale, or by 
public or private purchase, with or 
without advertising such sale or purchase, 
such advertising being hereby expressly 
waived, and such sale or purchase may be 
made in one or a series of sales or 
purchases as you may elect, 
5, You are authorized to accept from me 
oral or telephonic orders for the purchase 
or sale of securities and in consideration 
of your acceptance of this agreement, I 
hereby waive any defense that I may have 
because any such order was not in writing 
or evidenced by a memorandum in writing as 
required by the Statute of Frauds, or 
other statute. 
9. Communications of every kind referring 
in any way to my account may be sent to me 
at my address given hereon . . . and all 
communications so sent, whether by mail, 
telegraph, messenger or otherwise, shall 
be deemed given to me personally whether 
actually received by me or not. 
Kim Johnson, secretary/treasurer of Western, testified that 
this language meant that, on the fifth business day following 
880198-CA Z 
1 ransacticn by buying - • « v. 'ho control i *• 
iemair, open. 
In about June 19 83, Knudsvig purchased 20/000 shares of 
Venture Consolidated/ Inc. (Venture) for $200 through Western 
This offering was a new issue of penny stock for which West-, 
was a market maker. Knudsvig claimed that she never receive*-: 
stock certificate, but had attempted to obtain a duplicate 
certificate in August or September of 1983 and also in November 
of 1984 
,., w~-y . io^ Venture shareholders, approved an acquisition 
*:-j .^rger w.th several Big 0 Tire franchises. They changed 
the ame of the corporation to Tires, Inc. and approved a 2u 
1 reverse stock split* On September , 1984, Louis Babcoek, 
Western's Ogden representative, who was quainted with 
Knudsvig through past dealings, notified Knudsvig that 
"-»•*, re shares had increased in. value from $.01 to $.1' 
, and asked her if she wanted to sell Knudsvig 
_j. tus. Later/ excited about the rise in value of h«=L 
she unsuccessfully attempted to contact Babcoek, She then 
contacted Western's office in Salt Lake City ...and spoke to 
Richard Davis. After a lengthy discussion* Davis concluded 
that Knudsvig wanted to sell her stock and wished to credit the 
sales commission to Babcoek. While Knudsvig was stil] 
telephone, Davis contacted Richard C. Parker, Western's 
executive vice president, for instructions on how to consummate 
the transaction, which was complicated by Knudsvig*s confusion, 
the lack of a stock certificate., and having to credit the 
commission to* Babcoek., Parker, in spite of these difficulties, 
immediately approved the purchase from Knudsvig for $.16114 per 
share through Western's market making account. Davis returned 
to the phone, informed Knudsvig of the sale and selling price, 
and told her that she had to mail in the stock certificate. He 
informed her that it was possible for a trade to take place 
without possession of the certificate since she had ten [sic] 
days after the trade to bring in the certificate. Parker 
stated that the sale was handled .in 'Li uuinner because 
Knudsvig was an established, sophistic*-: ••:] customer who had 
paid for and delivered stock :-»•• ^  I i nio: / manner over a long 
p p r i or1 o f *- ': *- •• 
Knudsvig disputes Davis's statements, aiiuouyh hei 
testimony is somewhat unclear. Initially, she denied that H :~ 
phone call ever took, place, bi it then admitted to making the 
c-V.''. She denied that she ever requested, the sal<=> of her '••'• 
88019-8 -Gift 3 
stock. She further testified that she had no intention of 
making a sale, thought that Western could not sell her stock 
without possession of the certificate, and in 1983, Western had 
cancelled a similar sale because she could not find her stock 
certificate. The trial court found that she had assumed there 
could be no final sale until she was able to get a stock 
certificate. 
Knudsvig stated that, at this point, she was unaware that 
her stock had been sold because she never received a written 
confirmation of the sale. Western, however, stated that, 
within the five day period following the sale, it had sent a 
written confirmation to Knudsvig's address. Western did not 
close Knudsvig*s account for seventy-five days after the 
purported sale, at which time the value of the stock had risen 
to $8.00 per share.1 Johnson testified that Western had 
waited for this unusually long period of time to cover 
Knudsvig's short position because she was a good customer, she 
had indicated that she was replacing the certificate, and 
Johnson thought that he was acting in Knudsvig's best 
interest. Western's eventual buy-in resulted in a $5,402.20 
deficit in Knudsvig's account, which is the basis for Western's 
complaint. 
In its memorandum decision, entered on October 23, 1986, 
the trial court found that Knudsvig continued to be the owner 
of the stock, that the alleged sale never occurred, and that 
Western's activity was unconscionable. The trial court 
dismissed Western's complaint and awarded punitive damages to 
Knudsvig in the amount of $10,000. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) in 
finding that Knudsvig did not authorize the sale of her stock; 
(2) in finding that Western violated Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) in finding that 
Western violated various National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) rules, and in finding that there is a private 
right of action for violation of NASD rules; and (4) in 
awarding punitive damages. 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless they "are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
1. At the time of the trial, October 16, 1986, the value of 
the stock was approximately $30.00 per share. 
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definite and firm conviction tbit •* mistake has been made." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also Cove 
View Excavating & Const, Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474, 477' (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Factual findings are given considerable 
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess ; .-
v.'itnesses's credibility. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Power Systems, 
97 Utah Adv, Rep, at 3b; Southland Corp, v. Potter, 760 P ?:] 
120, 321 (Utah Ct, App 1988). Findings of fact are cleaiiv 
erroneous, if the appellant can show that the/ are without. 
adequate evidentiary foundation i: if they are- induced by A:I 
erroneous view of the law. Ft ate v. Walker, * '• •-! - *-' 
(Utah 1987) 
~u carefully examining the record, we nc, . ^ nat LU 
much conflicting evidence and inconsistent testimony, 
especially regarding Knudsvig's telephone CE.11 Western, m 
which Knudsvig purportedly authorized the sale of her st<" "• 
and regarding whether or not Knudsvig received written 
confirmation of the alleged sale from Western. The trial court 
found that Knudsvig had no intention of selling her stock, thr?t 
she was the rightful owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture 
stock, and that Western failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that written notice of the transaction was 
ma i 1 en *; < K n u d s v *. - -
u. v.!^u,„: w ---estern ax.yae< _hat -he trial c o u r t should nave 
believed its evidence rather than Knudsvig's. However, lhe 
clear weight of the evidence supports the trial courts-
findings that the sale was not authorized and did not tan^ 
place, and we defer to the trial court's advantaged position ii I 
evaluating the witnesses' s demeanor and credibility. We find 
no error i •• * H<> h u r t ' s rulings on this issue.2 
JURISDICTION 
Western asserts that the tridi i^ -ax.. j a e d in Luioj. , . .^t 
* iPtoH y,io, "!r»i^ -5 and 10b-10 of tne Securities Exchange 
2. Although Knudsvig raises affirmative defenses to Western 1s 
action under Utah Code Ann. § -70A-8-301, the Securities 
Exchange Act of ^ ^ 4 § 10b-10, and § 12 of the NASD manual, we 
do not considei u :em because: (1) we sustain the trial court's 
finding that no bile of the securities occurred, thus obviating 
the need for - defense to the ;;aie; «.-.'" / 0) the ••••ffies did not 
: aise the • f; ;-;;:••-. f>n appeal. 
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Act of 1934 and various NASD rules. Before we examine the 
merits of this argument, however, we raise sua sponte the issue 
of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. -.As stated in 
Carreathers v. Carreathers, 654 P.2d 871 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), 
[t]he parties have not raised the issue of 
. .. • subject matter jurisdiction . . . in 
the trial court or in this appeal. 
However, the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of 
an action without an assignment of error, 
and an appellate court may decide a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction 
where it appears on the face of the record. 
Id. at 871; see also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Furthermore, "this Court may, on its own 
motion, determine lack of jurisdiction." Bailey v. Sound Lab, 
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also State v. 
Brandimart, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Haw. 1986). "Jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred upon this Court by stipulation" of the 
parties. Bailey, 649 P.2d at 1044. 
Exclusive jurisdiction over causes of action stemming from 
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is vested in 
the federal courts. The 1934 Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1981), 
states in relevant part: 
The district courts of the United States 
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of this chapter or the rules 
and regulations thereunder. . . . Any 
suit or action to enforce any liability or 
duty created by this chapter or rules and 
regulations thereunder . . . may be 
brought in any such district or in the 
district wherein the defendant is found or 
is an inhabitant . . . . 
Federal courts generally interpret this statute to mean what it 
says: federal jurisdiction is exclusive over actions brought 
to enforce the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Securities Investor 
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 
1985); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 
(10th Cir. 1971); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd,—1981A, 604 F. Supp. 
1365, 1368-69 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 
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R:.-) . .19 (N.I), Ohio 1 9 8 3 ) ; K l e c k l e y v . H e L e r t , : -
i . H-. App, *'spr* 
There is a split in authority as to whether the iyj4 hiA, 
can be used as an affirmative defense in state actions. Some 
jurisdictions assert that state courts do not. have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate federal securities law questions brought under 
the 1934 Act/ even when raised as an affirmative defense. 
Instead, they "squarely endorse1* the proposition that " [w]here 
exclusive jurisdiction exists, only-the federal courts can 
provide affirmative relief.'1 Alkoff, 611 F. Supp. at 66 
(Quoting L e w v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 967 "(2nd Cir. 1980)), 
While recognizing inai the statute'precludes state court 
adjudication of direct claims based upon the violation of the 
1934 Act, other jurisdictions all ow state courts to consider 
claims based on the 1934 Act which are raised as affirmative 
defenses in state court actions. Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. 
Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59, 63 (2nd Cir, 1986); 
Scope Indus, v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 576 F. 
Supp. 373, 379 (CD. Cal. 1983); Birenbaum v.- Bache & Co., 555 
S,W.2d 513, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
•ven so. tnejt jm. i^icdons do not allow state courts to 
grar/w affirmative relief to a defendant who prevails on such 
federal claims, h-u , instead, force the defendant to go to 
federal court to seek affirmative relief Andrea Theatres, 787 
F.2d at 63. Further, these jurisdiction!:; distinguish between 
"cases," wherein state determination is precluded, and 
"questions/11 v;<--ich the state may adjudicate, which arise under 
the 1934 Act. Scope Indus, , 576 F. Supp. at; 378-79; Birenbaum, 
555 S-W*2d at 515. The Birenbaum court adopted the United 
States Supreme Court's reasoning regardi'-'r inr^di'^inri r.ver 
patent claim0 '- -r;*i<:; ••.-; t-his distinct!-^ 
There is d clear aistinctioi 
case and a question arising ^ 
patent laws. The former arises when the 
plaintiff in his opening pleading—be it a 
bill, ^omnlaint, or declaration—-sets up a 
right .*:.Jer the patent laws as ground for 
a recovery.. n* such the state courts have 
no jurisdiction. The latter may appear in 
the plea or answer or in the vestimony. 
The determination of such question i s not 
beyond the compet" w,"y ' r ''hr* fate 
tribunals. 
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Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & 
Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (emphasis in Birenbaum). 
The Birenbaum court found that the state court was competent to 
adjudicate a 10b-5 violation issue because it Honly appeared by 
way of defense, it is merely a question in the case, rather 
than a claim for relief.** Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515. 
Similarly, the Scope Industries court, in determining that 
the state court had jurisdiction to consider a defense based on 
the 1934 Act, also distinguished between cases, which the state 
court could not adjudicate, and questions, which the state 
court was competent to consider. It stated that whether a 
"colorable claim existed under the Exchange Act at the 
commencement of the underlying action is different in kind than 
the question of whether or not Scope violated the Exchange Act, 
as alleged in the underlying action.1* Scope Indus. , 756 F. 
Supp. at 378-79. 
We do not find it necessary today to decide which of these 
lines of cases we will follow. Although Knudsvig asserted Rule 
10b-10 as an affirmative defense, her claims under the 1934 Act 
were brought in the form of a counterclaim for violation of 
Rule 10b-5 as well as Rule 10b-10. Thus, even under the more 
liberal authority, she does not qualify jurisdictionally. 
These claims are in the nature of a case rather than a question 
and, accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider them. 
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES 
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1981), requires securities 
associations, such as the NASD, to adopt disciplinary rules. 
See Emmons v. Merrill, Lvnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Section 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) 
requires that M[e]very self-regulatory organization shall 
comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and its own rules." Thus, the NASD 
comes under the regulatory provisions of the Act and is subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a). 
Therefore, any action based on violation of NASD rules must be 
brought in the federal courts. 
That Knudsvig1s counterclaim may be construed to be 
compulsory under Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) still does not confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear the merits of her claim. 
"A party is not required to file a compulsory counterclaim in 
aaai98-CA» 8 
the district -a-ui t if the claii n exceed;, t,:. < n i i sdict ion o: 
that court." Brewer v, Bradley, 431 So. 2d 544, 545 (Ala. * • • 
App. '^^ 3 
o summarize, Knu^.-u - • ouuturcji ;olies exclusively 
upon alleged violations of the 1934 Act and NASD rules, which 
are regulated under the 1934 Act, all of which come under 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Once we have determined that 
we have no jurisdiction over a claim, all we T**V do is dismiss 
the action. See In re Marriage of Passiales, -!<» ill, App* 3d 
629, 494 N.E.2d 541, 547, 98 111. Dec. 419 (1986); Wells v. 
Noldon, 679 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct, Vr 1984" • ^ ref^r-
dismiss Knudsvig"'1 s entire cou.nterclf: a. *.. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGEb 
The \.LHXX ^,„._ oismissed Western's complaint and, even 
though the court failed to find any actual damages stemming 
from the a'1/nged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in Kn vlg's counterclaim i* awarded punitive damages to 
Knudsvig, . ;ice we h<:,v* found that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to hear \ht- counterclaim, it follows that 
Knudsvig* s associate-! s -.'jMest for damages fails. See Howard v. 
Miller, 108 xil. Api . ..- 4<8 N.E.2d 680, 685, 63 111. Dec, 
749 (1982); see also DeWitt County Pub, Bldq. Comm'n v. County 
of DeWitt, 128 111. App. 3d 11, 469 N.E.2d 689, 694, 83 111. 
Dec. 82 (1984). . Further, Ma court without jurisdiction «:annr*. 
order affirmative relief." Chadwick v. Pillard, 536 F. Supp 
7?, 75 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). Therefore, the trial couri -- " f-
** punitive damages. 
3. Federal practice is similar: If a federal court has 
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's clai::;, it will also have 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same actir<y 
occurrence. However, "if the counterclaim is entirel; 
beyond the competence of the federal courts, as for exampit-
action precluded by sovereign immunity or one involving a 
purely probate matter, the court may not adjudicate it even .  
the claim would otherwise be treated as compulsory." W:igh4 
y'- 11 *• r, Federal Practice & Procedure, ' • ^  •* .•'- *"• f ] Q~*' -
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We af£ij^n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of W e s t e r n ' s 
compLsrlTnt: b u t r eve r s , e i t s ^ # ? a r d of p u n i t i v e damages . 
Regna l 1*L G a r f f , J u d g e 
WE CONCUR: 
J*k&$C J77- SU&k^D 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson,^oudge 
aaaiaa-CA. m 
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